In his development of formal semantics for natural language Montague [1970a]Montague [1973], 1 Richard Montague modeled the meaning (Frege's sense) of a term A by its Carnap intension CI(A), the function which assigns to each state a, specifying a "possible world", "time" and "context of use", the denotation den(A)(a) of A in that state.
which will be explained and motivated when not obvious, but cannot be rigorously justified, as I will not specify with any precision the all-important rendering (or translation) operation . . . render − −− → A. Some would argue that this is the most important part of the extraction of meanings from linguistic expressions, and I would agree with them. On the other hand, I think that a theory of how the subsequent processing of formal terms should proceed is of some value, partly because it provides specific, mathematical objects which purport to model meanings (however these are generated), and mostly because it sets conditions and limitations on the rendering operation which might be of some help in linguistic analysis. In addition, the theory delivers claims of synonymy and non-synonymy for natural language examples, which can be compared with our intuitions, help assess its usefulness and, perhaps, shed some light on the relation of synonymy.
The technical part of the paper-the logic-is found mostly in sections 1 and 3; it is illustrated and motivated by a number of simple examples in the middle section 2, and by an analysis of two standard puzzles about meanings in the last section 4. The Appendix establishes an interpretation of Montague's intensional logic in Montague [1973] into L ar .
In lectures on this topic, I sometimes use the subtitle "derived by taking programming languages seriously", to emphasize the dependence of this theory on algorithmic ideas, which goes much deeper than the modeling of meanings by abstract algorithms. §1. The typed -calculus with acyclic recursion, L ar . Like Montague's language of intensional logic in Montague [1973] , L ar is a typed calculus of terms: each term A is tagged with a type , and (for each assignment g to its free variables) denotes an object den(A, g) in some specified universe T of objects of type . 4 §1.1. Types are defined recursively, starting with the basic types e of entities, t of truth values, and s of states, and allowing the formation of arbitrary function types ( → ). In the shorthand used for simple recursive definitions by computer scientists,
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:≡ e | t | s | ( 1 → 2 ) (Types)
i.e., the set of types is the smallest set which includes the distinct "symbols" e, t, s and is closed under the pairing operation ( 1 → 2 ). A type is pure (or state-free) if the state type s does not occur in it:
:≡ e | t | ( 1 → 2 ). (Pure types)
The types of L ar specify kinds of semantic objects, and should not be confused with the syntactic categories of natural language. Many syntactic categories may be mapped onto the same type: for example, intransitive verbs (run) and proper nouns (man) will both be rendered by terms of the same L ar -type (ẽ →t) (see below), although their syntactic categories are obviously distinct. §1.2. Universes. We assume given a basic universe T e of entities which contains (at least) three distinct objects 0, 1, er, and a non-empty set T s of states. Starting with these, we define for each type the set T of objects of type by the following recursion:
T t = T e , T ( → ) = the set of all functions p : T → T .
An object x is pure if x ∈ T for a pure type .
In the intended interpretation, T e contains the natural numbers N = {0, 1, . . . }, the real numbers and other mathematical objects, but also people (dead or alive, or who might live in some alternate universe), trees, points in spacetime, etc.
6 The "error object" er provides a useful "exceptional" denotation for expressions which have no natural value, like "the largest number" or "Mary's husband", when Mary is not married (or has many husbands).
A state a (intuitively) specifies a "full context" in which the terms of L ar can be interpreted, We will say more about states in Section 2, but, for the technical definitions in this section, all we need is that T s is some non-empty set. The pure objects are built up from the members of T e and do not depend on the choice of T s .
Finally, the identification T e = T t sounds a bit peculiar, but it is both economical and useful: we identify "truth" with the number 1, "falsity" with the number 0, and we assign er to terms of type t which have no natural truth value. The correct formal definitions then should assign er to "Mary's husband is tall", if Mary does not have exactly one husband. §1.3. Carnap objects. Especially significant are the types (s → ) of "statedependent" objects, functions p : T s → T . In particular, we let 7 t ≡ (s → t) ≡ the type of Carnap intensions, (2)ẽ ≡ (s → e) ≡ the type of Carnap individual concepts.
It is also useful to introduce the notatioñ q ≡ (ẽ →t) →t ≡ the type of unary quantifiers, which will type terms like "every woman", "some man", etc. 6 If we put all sets in T e , as we should, then it is a proper class and not a set. I will disregard this technical wrinkle, which can be easily corrected by introducing some irrelevant technicalities.
7 Tẽ comprises the "senses" of Montague. I will consistently refer to them as Carnap intensions, to avoid confusion with Frege's senses and the modeling of meaning by referential intensions. 8 We can define a map →˜ on the pure types, starting with (2) and (3) and adding the recursive clause if ≡ ( 1 → 2 ), then˜ ≡ (˜ 1 →˜ 2 ).
Nowq is the value of that map with q ≡ (e → t) → t, the type of "pure" (state-independent) unary quantifiers.
Entities 0, 1, 2, . . . : e Names, demonstratives John, I, he, him, today :ẽ Common nouns man, unicorn, temperature :ẽ →t Adjectives tall, young : (ẽ →t) → (ẽ →t) Propositions it rains :t Intransitive verbs stand, run, rise :ẽ →t Transitive verbs find, loves, be :ẽ ×ẽ →t Adverbs rapidly, allegedly : (ẽ →t) → (ẽ →t) Table 1 . Empirical constants. §1.4. Currying. We will use the familiar abbreviation 1 × 2 → ≡ ( 1 → ( 2 → )), and if p ∈ T ( 1 × 2 → ) , we will write
p(x, y) = p(x)(y).
This expresses the usual identification of a function of two variables with a onevariable function which takes functions as values. These notations can be iterated, so that 1 × 2 × 3 → ≡ ( 1 → ( 2 → ( 3 → ))), and for p ∈ T 1 × 2 × 3 → ,
p(x, y, z) = p(x)(y, z) = p(x, y)(z) = p(x)(y)(z).
Finally, in describing types, we will omit parentheses, replace them with brackets, etc., to facilitate understanding at the cost of strict, grammatical accuracy. §1.5. Constants. We fix a (finite) set of typed constants K , the "vocabulary", and we write c : to indicate that c has type . Examples of constants are given in Table 1 , but we will add more later on-including the usual logical constants in Table 3 . Notice the absence of propositional attitudes (believe that, assert that) with which we will not deal in this paper, except for a couple of comments. The typing will be explained in Section 2.
The grammatically correct terms will depend on the choice of K , and so we write L ar (K ) for the language determined from a specific K . §1.6. Variables. For each type , the language L ar (K ) has two infinite sequences of variables,
• the pure variables v 0 , v 1 , . . . , and • the recursion variables or locations p 0 , p 1 , . . . Syntactically, pure variables will be quantified, while locations will be assigned-to. This distinction will play a very important role in the intensional semantics of L ar . §1.7. Terms are defined recursively, starting with the variables and the constants and using application, -abstraction and (mutual) acyclic recursion, which we will Table 2 summarizes the definition of terms in the computer science shorthand with all the necessary side conditions, except for the definition of acyclicity, which is as follows. §1.8. Acyclic recursion. 9 The best, intuitive way to understand the recursive construct is to understand "where" as we would in ordinary language: loves(j, s) where {j := John, m := Mary, s = sister(m)} communicates the same information as if j is John, m is Mary, and s is the sister of m, then j loves s, in other words "John loves Mary's sister"-and, as we will prove, this term is (formally) synonymous with loves(John, sister(Mary)) which renders "John loves Mary's sister". The acyclicity condition guarantees the possibility of this sort of reading, as follows.
9 If we remove the acyclicity restriction on the recursion construct, we obtain the -calculus with full recursion L r , a mild extension of the language PCF which has been extensively studied by computer scientists, cf. Plotkin [1977] . Essentially all the results of this paper can be extended to L r , but at a heavy price in mathematical technicalities, starting with the need to develop different (and substantially more complex) denotational semantics. Full recursion is admitted in FLR, and some applications of it to the philosophical analysis of self-reference were included in Moschovakis [1994] ; it is a moot point now whether it can contribute enough to computational semantics to be worth the considerable extra work.
A system of equations {p 1 := A 1 , . . . , p n := A n } is acyclic if it is possible to assign a natural number rank(p i ) to each of the locations, so that
the obvious idea is that p i has higher rank than p j if its value "depends" (or could depend) on that of p j . For example, the system {f := father(m), m := mother(j), j := John} is acyclic, with rank(j) = 0, rank(m) = 1, rank(f) = 2, while the one-equation system {p := c(p)} is not acyclic, because any ranking of p would need to satisfy rank(p) > rank(p), which is absurd. Acyclic systems express "trivial" systems of recursive definitions which "close off" (and produce unique values) in a finite number of steps, as will become clear in the definition of denotations.
A term A is explicit if no recursion variable occurs in it; and recursive if it is of the form A 0 where {p 1 := A 1 , . . . , p n := A n }.
10 A term is closed if it has no free occurrences of variables.
As with types, we will "misspell" terms, skipping parentheses and font-changes, inserting brackets to indicate grouping, writing "A loves B" rather than "loves(A)(B)", etc. §1.9. Denotations. We assume given an object 11 c ∈ T for each constant c of type , so that together with the sets of entities and states in §1.2, we now have a complete description of the structure in which we will interpret the terms:
An assignment is a function g which associates with each pure or recursion variable x of type an object g(x) ∈ T . If x : is a variable and t ∈ T , then the update of g by the assignment x := t is defined in the obvious way,
The denotation function on terms and assignments is defined by recursion on the terms in the usual way, at least as far as the explicit terms go:
where the values p i are defined for i = 1, . . . , n by recursion on rank(p i ):
10 By these definitions, A where { } is both explicit and recursive if no recursion variable occurs in A, but this term is congruent with A. We will sometimes assume tacitly that the "dummy recursions" where { } are eliminated, by passing to a congruent term in which they do not occur. (Congruence is formally defined in §1.11.)
11 It is possible to consider more general semantics for L ar , where the constants come equipped with "meanings" in addition to their denotations, but we will not do this here.
where p k 1 , . . . , p k m are the variables with ranks lower than rank(p i ).
To justify the definition, we must verify simultaneously with it, for each clause, that den(A)(g) depends only on the values g(x) of the assignment for variables x which occur free in A; and that if A : , then den(A)(g) ∈ T .
To illustrate the definition in the recursive case, consider the closed term
Assuming that the indicated constants name the obvious objects and relations. we compute the denotation of A in stages, as follows: For denotational term equality we will use the familiar notation from logic, |= A = B ⇐⇒ for all assignments g, den(A)(g) = den(B)(g). (5) §1.10. Formal replacement and the Replacement Property. If A is a term, x is a variable of type and C is a term of type , then A{x :≡ C } ≡ the result of replacing x by C in all its free occurrences in A.
The replacement is free if no free occurrence of a variable in C becomes bound in A{x :≡ C }, and in this case, for every assignment g,
the proof is by a tedious induction on the form of the term A. We will tacitly assume that all replacements are free when we apply this operation. §1.11. Term congruence. Two terms are congruent if one can be obtained from the other by alphabetic changes of the bound variables, the addition of "dummy recursions" where { }, and re-orderings of the assignments within the acyclic recursion construct. Formally, congruence is the smallest equivalence relation ≡ c between terms which satisfies the following conditions: here C { p :≡ q} symbolizes the n-fold replacement The last condition means that the assignments within { } are interpreted as a a set, not a sequence.
It is easy to verify that if A ≡ c B, then |= A = B, and we will see later that congruence also respects referential synonymy. Thus congruent terms are identical for all intents and purposes, and we will treat them as such. §1.12. L ar vs. the typed -calculus. It can be easily shown that every term is denotationally equivalent with an explicit term, so that, as far as denotations go, there is no need for the acyclic recursion construct. This will not be true of the intensional semantics, however, for which the construct has been introduced: we will show in §3.20 that there are recursive terms of L ar which are not referentially synonymous with any explicit term, and some of these render most directly English sentences.
12 §2. Examples. Beyond fleshing out some of the formal definitions of Section 1, the simple examples in this section will help illustrate the modeling of meaning coming up next. To facilitate discussing meanings in the examples, let us jump the gun and introduce here the notation A ≈ B ⇐⇒ A and B are referentially synonymous.
The precise definition is given in §3.17. In fact, -conversion almost never preserves meaning, just as logical deduction does not-otherwise all theorems would be synonymous, which is absurd; so it is important not to assume it unthinkingly in analyzing the examples. §2.2. States. To be specific, we will assume in this paper that a state is an infinite tuple which specifies a possible world i, a moment of time j, a point in space k, who is I (the "speaker"), who is referred to by the first, second, etc., occurrence of John, which object is referred to by the first, second, etc., occurrence of this, etc. In short: in addition to its special first four values, a state determines references for (potentially) infinitely many occurrences of every proper name and every demonstrative in the lexicon. We will refer to these values as world(a), time(a), John 1 (a), he 2 (a), etc.
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For example, to determine the truth value of "John loves her and she loves him", we must know when the sentence was asserted (because love fades), but also who "John", "her", "she", "him" are-and there could be as few as two and as many as four persons involved. §2.3. Carnap objects of type (s → ); rigidity. These include the denotations of proper names like John and the demonstratives He, her, today, . . . , of typeẽ, as well as the Carnap intensions of typet, for example it rains, for which it rains(a) = 1 ⇐⇒ it is raining in the state a. dere(x, a) = (b)x(a) (x : s → )) (7) then the object dere(x, a) : (s → ) is rigid and denotes x(a) in every state. It is quite standard in philosophy of language today to assume that at least some proper names ("Aristotle") are rigid, but we will neither assume nor forbid this here. §2.4. Descriptions. The natural definition of the description operator returns an error if the existence and uniqueness are not fulfilled:
Notice that we do not ask for a unique x :ẽ, but a only a unique y : e in each state. Thus, assuming that "x is married to y" is unambiguously determined in each state (and local), we can set Mary's husband And "the King of France is bald" will also be assigned er today, contrary to Russell's wishes.
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15 This is really Kaplan's dthat(x, a) in Kaplan [1978a] , but I am using a different notation to avoid confusion, since Kaplan's understanding (and use) of this important construct is somewhat different from the present one. The notation dere(x, a) comes from the use we will make of these functions later on to distinguish between "de re" and "de dicto" readings of terms in modal contexts. I am not assuming that the language has a constant dere-I wouldn't know the English word for it.
16 Cf. the discussion in Moschovakis [1994] . §2.5. Connectives, quantifiers and the identity relations. Some of these are listed in Table 3 , and their definitions are obvious. For example,
with the obvious treatment of errors in these formulas, e.g., in full,
We will usually write "A = B" rather than "= (A, B)", since the type (oftenẽ) can be read off the types of A an B.
For a (pedantically spelled out) example of term-formation with these constants, consider (1). §2.6. Modal operators. We assume the language has a constant for the basic necessity operator, Montague's "full necessity", or "necessarily always", as Thomason calls it:
(p)(a) ⇐⇒ (∀b)p(b). Kaplan [1978b] argues convincingly that this interpretation is inappropriate for terms which contain demonstratives, but it is best to view his interpretation as a de re reading of the modality. With the notation dere (p, x) ⇐⇒ x necessarily has property p (p : (ẽ →t), x :ẽ), the correct definition is
The technique works for any modal operator: if F : (t →t), then
produces the corresponding de re version, with type (ẽ ×t) ×ẽ →t.
For more serious works on the modal part of the language, we would need to introduce additional modal constants, in the past, in all possible worlds (but at the present time and location), etc. §2.7. Locality and modality. An object An object which is not local is modal. A closed term A : (s → ) →t) is local or modal accordingly as it denotes a local or modal object.
For example, the negation operation ¬ : (t →t) is local, while : (t →t) is modal, by their definitions above. What seems (at first) surprising is that some common nouns and verbs are also modal, in this abstract sense, and that the distinction is worth noting.
If, for example, John is a man the constant rises cannot be reasonably interpreted by a local object, because we cannot tell whether the temperature is rising in state a from the mere knowledge of its value in a. We can interpret rises closest to our intuitions (and get the right truth value in the example) by setting a{j := t} = the state which differs from a only in that time(a{j := t}) = t,
or, more precisely (with a bit of calculus),
This object "rises" is then modal. For another example, consider the sentence the color of the sky ranged from light pink to deep, brooding red; the verb "ranges" is modal in this usage, since to determine whether ranges(color, a) we must evaluate color(b) for various states b which differ in location from the current state a.
It is important to distinguish modality-which has to do with the dependence of p(x, a) on values x(b) for states b = a-from the possible dependence of p(x, a) on properties of x(a) in states b = a. To interpret the verb "runs", for example, we might use one of the following two plausible interpretations:
runs-alt(x, a) ⇐⇒ x is running in state a, (9) 18 We assume a (local) constant temperature :ẽ →t, defined by temperature(x)(a) ⇐⇒ the temperature in state a is x(a) degrees.
where runs-alt(x, a) is defined like rise(x, a), using values of x(a{j := t}) for various t's. Suppose that in the current state a, the(President)(a) = Bush.
With the (more natural, I think) first interpretation, we cannot tell if runs(the President, a) (10)
solely from a snapshot of Bush in the current state, as he may just be standing in a running posture; to assert (10) we need to observe Bush for a small timeinterval around the current time-but we only need to observe Bush, not the person who might have been "the President" a few minutes before. Thus "runs" is local (directly from its definition), even though the truth value of runs(x, a) may depend on properties of x(a) in states b other than a. On the other hand, by its definition again, the truth value of runs-alt(the President, a) depends on who "the President" is in states other than a, and it may be in some doubt right about inauguration time; this is a modal verb.
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The natural (de re) interpretation of "run" works well with the quantifiers, as we defined them: every man is running render − −− → every(man)(runs), and this gets for each state a the truth value of for every x, if x(a) is a man in state a, then x(a) is running in state a. §2.8. Transitive verbs of typeẽ ×ẽ →t. The "currying" device of the -calculus models a transitive verb by a unary function p : (ẽ → (ẽ →t)), which assigns to each x :ẽ an intransitive verb; thus with the natural rendering John loves Mary render − −− → loves(John)(Mary), the term loves(John) denotes the relation of "being loved by John", which (the sentence claims) applies to Mary.
An object p of typeẽ×ẽ →t is local if each value p(x, y, a) depends only on x(a) and y(a), and there are obvious, natural notions of "local in the first variable" and "local in the second variable". The identity relations = : (s → ) × (s → ) →t are local, by their definition in §2.5. We can express the global identities using the full necessity operator in §2.6. §2.9. Co-indexing; rendering directly into L ar . Roughly speaking, co-indexing occurs when the references of some indexical expressions (he, him, his, etc.) in a 20 The de re reading of an intransitive verb F : (ẽ →t) →t can be obtained from the de dicto version as in the case of modal operators §2.6:
Which of the two should be used in each case is not a matter of logic but one of language, and so it must be done at the rendering stage; we choose the de dicto rendering for rising temperatures and the de re one for running Presidents because they give us the desired meanings (and truth values).
term are identified with that of a subterm by the introduction of a bound variable which refers to all of them. Some examples:
John loves himself
every man loves himself
John kissed his wife
John loves his wife and he honors her
. (14) John loves and honors his wife
How and under what circumstances this should be done is a big issue, of course, and I will not have much to say about it. There are, however, two important aspects of co-indexing which affect the subsequent extraction of meanings.
First, the reflexive "himself" obviously refers to John in (11), but why was "his" also assumed to refer to John in (13)? Perhaps the preceding sentence was "Jim is very upset", and it is Jim's wife that his friend John kissed, in which case we should leave kissed(John, wife(his)) alone and let the state determine who was kissed. Now, kissed(John, wife(his)) ≈ (j)kissed(j, wife(j)) (John), (16) which is not surprizing, since one can grasp the meaning of the right-hand-side without knowing the meaning of the word "his", that one needs to understand the left-hand-side; and so co-indexing does not preserve meaning. The important point is that on the present account, these two terms do not have the same local meaning in any state a, even when his(a) = John(a). In other words, co-indexing does not preserve local meanings: in this theory, the meaning of a term is determined completely by the meanings of its parts, and the state comes in only to fix the denotations of some of the constants. We will return to this important point in Section 4.
The referential intension of a term of type (s → ) corresponds to Kaplan's character in Kaplan [1978b] , while the local referential intension (at a state) corresponds to his content. However, Kaplan represents meanings by Carnap intensions (following Montague), and so he ends up with a coarser relation of local synonymy: he would assign the same content to the two sides of (16) in a state in which "his" refers to John, while the local referential intensions of these two terms are different. I am suggesting here that co-indexing is a formal operation on terms, to be performed after rendering. I will not attempt to define it precisely in these notes, because it is not completely clear at this point how to do it in full generality; the examples illustrate some of the ideas involved, and a correct, rigorous account should justify them. It will turn out that, naturally enough, (11) and (17) are referentially synonymous, but (13) is not referentially synonymous with (18), and neither is (14) referentially synonymous with (19) or (15) with (20)-not even locally, in any state. Moreover, we will show in §3.21 that the terms in (18), (19) and (20)are not synonymous with any explicit terms, i.e., their referential intensions can only be expressed using the recursion construct. §2.10. Typical ambiguity. The verb "is" has (at least) two meanings in English, illustrated by the plausible renderings Hesperus is a planet
Hesperus is Phosphorus
This is not the sort of ambiguity exemplified by the two readings of "every boy loves some girl", which is not a matter of logic and so does not concern us here: the two readings of "is" in these examples are determined by the types of (the formal renderings of) the words surrounding them, and so the distinction is a matter of logic. It is, however, a matter which must be handled at the rendering stage, and so we need to look into rendering a bit more carefully when it comes up, as it does in the formal treatment of proper names and quantifiers. §2.11. Proper nouns, demonstratives and quantifiers. One of the most original innovations in Montague [1973] is the interpretation of "John", "I" and "the blond" by quantifiers, of typeq ≡ (ẽ →t) →t (in the present system), so that he gets the uniform renderings, In addition to the obvious advantage of assigning similar formal renderings to similar constructions of natural language, the device also facilitates greatly the operation of coordination, which we will discuss in §2.12. I will not adopt this device, however, because it has two very serious defects, which far outweigh its desirable features.
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First, from a traditional, philosophical point of view, John, I and the blond are singular terms; we expect them to denote objects (in each state), while every(man) does not refer to any single object.
More substantially, from the logical point of view (which concerns us here), the Montague renderings produce the wrong logical form for the syntactical expressions that they purport to formalize, and this affects meaning. We will show in §3.22 that the Montague renderings
Hesperus is Phosphorus
render − −− → Hesperus( (u)Phosphorus( (v) = (u, v))),
Phosphorus is Hesperus
of the classic Frege examples are not referentially synonymous, as, of course, they should be.
24 The more natural renderings = (Hesperus, Phosphorus), = (Phosphorus, Hesperus)
which come from the typing we have adopted are referentially synonymous. It is quite easy to formulate simple rules which avoid unnecessary type-raising and give plausible renderings for expressions which involve both singular terms and quantifiers. For example, consider the following recipe, for phrases of the form
where A and B are rendered by terms of typeẽ orq, and C is a term of typeẽ →t orẽ ×ẽ →t denoting an intransitive verb or adjective, or a transitive verb.
John runs render − −− → runs(John) and every man runs
which is what we want. For transitive verbs we get four cases:
22 This evaluation imbedding x → (p)p(x) of a set X into its "second dual" is used in many parts of mathematics, most famously in the proof that the space of all bounded, linear functionals on a Hilbert space H is isomorphic with H . Its ultrafilter version, x → U(x) = {U ⊆ X | x ∈ U } is the key to the Stone Representation Theorem for Boolean algebras.
23 The Montague renderings are, of course, available in L ar , via the translation of his intensional logic into L ar in Appendix 5.
24 I am assuming here (and in the sequel) that "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is an identity statement, as Frege understood it, and so intuitively synonymous with "Phosphorus is Hesperus". There are other readings of "is" relating two proper names for which the order counts.
Corrected and edited notes for a course in NASSLLI 2003, July 2, 2003.
). An example of the last construction is (1). As for the alternate, less natural reading of this sentence, it is perhaps best to understand it as some woman is loved by every man which with the converse (v) (u)loves(u, v) rendering the passive "is loved" claims the expected "there is a woman who is loved by every man". §2.12. Coordination. "John and Mary entered the room" does not have quite the same meaning as "John entered the room and Mary entered the room", and neither does "John loves and honors his wife" mean quite the same as "John loves his wife and he honors her". To capture these distinctions we must coordinate "John" and "Mary", put them together into a single object-which, however, cannot now be a singular object of typeẽ, but must be a quantifier; and (what seems easier), we must combine "loves" and "honors" into a single relation. The abstraction construct of the -calculus is a powerful tool for defining these coordination operations. We also use the recursion construct in the following rules, to obtain simpler meanings. 
where {p 1 := P 1 , p 2 := P 2 } :ẽ ×ẽ →t, so that loves and honors
The constructions are similar for n-ary relations with any n and for the other Boolean operations ∨, ¬, etc., and we will omit them. §3. Referential intensions and referential synonymy. The technical work in this, the main section of the paper will proceed in three steps, as follows.
I. Reduction, irreducibility, normal forms ( §3.3- §3.11). We will define a binary relation ⇒ of reduction between terms, so that, intuitively, (A is congruent with B) or A and B have the same meaning and B expresses that meaning "more simply".
The disjunction is needed because some terms will not be assigned meanings, but the reduction calculus will still apply to them. We set
Irreducible terms which have meaning, express their meaning "as simply as possible".
We will then outline a proof of the following, simple but basic result of the paper: §3.1. Normal Form Theorem. For each term A, there is a recursive, irreducible term
such that A ⇒ nf(A); moreover, nf(A) is the unique (up to congruence) irreducible term to which A can be reduced, i.e., if A ⇒ B and B is irreducible, then B ≡ c nf(A).
We call nf(A) the normal form of A and we write
The terms A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n are the parts of A, and A 0 is its head.
The definition of reduction is by ten simple reduction rules, and the computation of normal forms is effective. ( §3.12- §3.16 ). Variables and some very simple, immediate terms have no meaning, they denote immediately. Constants, on the other hand, denote directly, but they have meanings (albeit trivial ones), and they contribute differently to the meanings of the terms in which they occur. The distinction between immediate and direct reference is a central feature of this theory and we will discuss it in §3.5, where immediate terms are defined, and in Section 4, especially §4.7.
II. Referential intensions
If A is proper (i.e., not immediate) and
then the referential intension int(A) of A is (intuitively) the abstract algorithm which computes for each assignment g the denotation den(A)(g), as that was described in Case (D4) of §1.9. The precise definition is given in §3.12.
The parts A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n of a term A are explicit, irreducible terms, whose meanings (if they exist) are exhausted by their denotations; and the assignments of Table 4 . The reduction calculus: congruence, transitivity, compositionality.
denotations to these terms may be regarded as the relevant, basic facts needed for the determination of the denotation of A. The referential intension int(A) "codifies" in a mathematical object these facts and the natural process by which den(A)(g) is computed from them.
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III. Referential synonymy ( §3.2- §3.22). Two proper terms are referentially synonymous if their referential intensions are naturally isomorphic, so that they model-they are, from the mathematical point of view-identical algorithms. It is also convenient to call two immediate terms X and Y referentially synonymous if they have the same denotation for all assignments to the variables. We have already introduced in (6) the notation A ≈ B ⇐⇒ A and B are referentially synonymous.
The precise, general definition of natural isomorphism in §3.16 is a bit technical, but it implies a very simple characterization of the referential synonymy relation on terms: §3.2. Referential Synonymy Theorem. Two terms A, B are referentially synonymous if and only if
n).
In particular,
25 The normal form of a Carnap intension A may be viewed as a generalized (or just precise) version of Davidson's truth conditions for A, whose relation to meaning is described as follows in Davidson [1967] : " . . . the obvious connection between a definition of truth of the kind Tarski has shown how to construct, and the concept of meaning . . . is this: the definition works by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence". Davidson does not take the next step, which is to extract a semantic object from these truth conditions and call it "the meaning of A", and, in fact, he denies that this step is useful or even possible. Despite this important difference, it is quite clear that the approach to language in this paper is very close to Davidson's, and The result reduces referential synonymy to a system of (effectively determined) denotational identities between explicit, irreducible terms, and it is at the heart of the proposed theory of meaning.
We now turn to the technical development of parts I -III. §3.3. The reduction calculus: congruence, transitivity, compositionality. The first five rules of the Reduction Calculus are listed in Table 4 , and they simply insure that the reduction relation is transitive and compositional, and that it extends the congruence relation. They do not produce by themselves any non-trivial reductions. §3.4. The reduction rules for recursion. These are listed in Table 5, and they The examples have been silly because the rules we have introduced so far don't do much reducing: basically they say that nested occurrences of "where" can be "flattened out", which is an obvious move. The next rule is not so innocuous. Not much difference between the two, perhaps, but those who use Procedure 1 never encounter the "full" functions "He" and " Scott", only their values in the particular state a. Put another way, in terms of meanings: the (full) meaning of "He" and that of "Scott" are parts of the meaning of B (and hence of A(x)) for the notion of meaning that will be determined by this reduction relation.
Only two more rules remain, but they are the ones which do most of the work. The first of these depends for its formulation on the notion of immediacy and-for the first time-differentiates between pure and recursion variables! §3.5. Immediate terms and the application rule. Variables (of either kind) are immediate; terms of the form p(v 1 , . . . , v n ) are immediate if p is a location and v 1 , . . . , v n are pure variables; and if X is immediate, then so is (u)(X ). Briefly:
The key point is that if p is a location of function type and u, v are pure variables, then p(v) is immediate while u(v) is not. Terms which are not immediate are proper. In computational terms, we can think of a location p : ( → ) of function type as having its entire graph (table, course of values) stored "in the machine", as soon as it is specified by an assignment, and then any value p(v) of it is simply read; a pure variable u : ( → ) is represented by a port, and to access a value u(v) we must make a call to that port, which then provides the required value u(v). Immediate terms act like generalized locations, so that (for example), once p is specified and the values of z and w are known, then (u, v)p(u, z, w) is immediately available for further computations.
A(B)
Constants are proper, in any type; to understand this don't think of "Scott" (whose "computation" appears to be trivial), think of " " which calls for the nontrivial recomputation of the number each time it is encountered. It is standard advice to beginning programmers to set up an assignment p := and then replace " " by "p" throughout their program, if " " occurs many times. The new program expresses a more efficient algorithm, which computes only once, stores the value, and then just reads it each time it is needed.
The application rule is stated in Table 6 . To understand why the non-immediacy restriction is needed, consider the example John is tall 
so that, in particular, tall(j) where {j := John} ≈ tall(j ) where {j := j, j := John}.
But this is surely not right, at least if we allow for some computational aspect in the notion of meaning: because it takes three steps to compute the right-hand-side (as we have been doing these computations), while two suffice for the left. Moreover, if we did this several times, we would get arbitrarily long terms of the form tall(j 1 ) where {j 1 := j 2 , j 2 := j 3 , . . . , j n := j n+1 , j n+1 := John}, all of them allegedly synonymous with "John is tall", which does not look right. Finally, the application rule is consistent with our intuitions about synonymy only because of our disallowing the interpretation of the constants of L ar by propositional because p : t in this term, which means that the constant I know denotes a function K : T t → T t such that K (1) = 1, since "I know that 1 + 1 = 2"; and hence "I know that A" for every true proposition A, which is absurd. Table 7 , consider the Carnap intension every man danced with his (own) wife
The crucial part is the -term to which the quantifier (every)(man) is applied, and for that we first reduce the matrix:
B ≡ danced(u, wife(u)) ⇒ nf danced(u, w) where {w := wife(u)}.
The standard computation of the value of B requires us to set w := wife(u) for any u, so what is really being computed is the function w (u) = wife(u)-which is, in fact, what we need for the subsequent application of the quantifier; and the simplest way to effect this is to set (u)(B) ⇒ (u)danced(u, w (u)) where {w := (u)wife(u)}.
The reduction calculus does not justify the next step we would like to take, (u)wife(u) ⇒ wife, but we will see later that This completes the definition of the reduction relation. We claim that it preserves meaning, so it had better preserve at least denotations: §3.8.
Proof is simple, by induction on the definition of the reduction relation.
It is also easy to read off the reduction rules a simple characterization of irreducible terms, defined in (21) Proof is simple, by inspection of the reduction rules. For (b), if one of the hypotheses fails to hold, then one of the rules (rep1), (ap) or (recap) produces a non-trivial reduction; and if all the hypotheses hold, then every reduction rule which applies produces a congruent term.
For (c), suppose first that (u)(A) is irreducible; this implies that A is irreducible, otherwise we could apply (rep2) with any non-trivial reduction of A, and also that A is explicit, otherwise the -rule would apply. (Notice that if A ≡ A 0 where { }, then the -rule gives (u)A ⇒ (u)A 0 where { }, which is congruent with (u)(A).) For the converse, if A is explicit, irreducible, then (rep2) and the -rule both yield trivial reductions of (u)(A) to a congruent term.
For (d), similarly, if a recursive term is irreducible then all its parts must be explicit, otherwise one of the recursion rules (head) or (B-S) would produce a nontrivial reduction, and they must also be irreducible, otherwise (rep3) would produce a non-trivial reduction. And conversely, if all the parts are explicit and irreducible, then none of these rules produces a non-trivial reduction. §3.10. Normal forms. We define the normal form nf(A) of each term A by the following recursion on terms, assuming in each of the clauses that all bound locations are distinct and distinct from all the free locations. (This can be insured by making suitable alphabetic changes on the bound variables of the given terms before we apply each clause.) 
In the next result we summarize some of the basic properties of normal forms which, in particular, provide a proof of the Normal Form Theorem §3.1. §3.11. Theorem. For every term A:
(1) The normal form of A is a recursive term
with explicit, irreducible parts A 0 , A 1 , . . . , A n , so that it is irreducible.
(2) A ⇒ nf(A). (3) A and nf(A) have the same free variables. (4) A constant c occurs in A if and only if it occurs in nf(A). (5) If c : is a constant and C : is a closed term of the same type, then
A{c :≡ C } ⇒ nf(A) {c :≡ C }.
(6) If a recursion variable r : occurs free in A, and if X is an immediate term of the same type and free for r in A, then nf(A) {r :≡ X } ≡ c nf A{r :≡ X } . 
It follows that if A ⇒ B and B is irreducible, then B ≡ c nf(A).
Outline of proof. (1) -(6) are shown by induction on the definition of nf(A), and (7) follows by induction on the definition of the reduction relation. These arguments are all simple but a bit messy, especially the rather technical (6) and then (7), which requires (6) in the fussiest case of the -rule. (However, (5) and (6) express important permutability properties of the construction A → nf(A) which go beyond the usefulness of (6) in proving (7).)
Finally, if B is irreducible, then B ≡ c nf(B), by the definition of irreducibility, since B ⇒ nf(B); and so if A ⇒ B, then nf(A) ≡ c nf(B) ≡ c B by (7). §3.12. Referential intensions. Let G be the set of all assignments to the variables, suppose that A is a proper (non-immediate) term with normal form nf(A) ≡ A 0 where {p 1 := A 1 , . . . , p n := A n }, and for i = 0, . . . , n set
The referential intension of A is the tuple of functions int(A) = (α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α n ). 
Notice that if A, A 0 : and
and for i = 1, . . . , n, α i :
Moreover, because of the acyclicity of nf(A), each α i satisfies the following condi- tion, for all g, d 1 , . . . , d n , d 1 , . . . , d n , with rank(j) = rank(p j ): 
where, for each g, d 1 , . . . , d n are the unique solutions of the system of equations
guaranteed by the acyclicity condition.
Thus the referential intension of a non-immediate term A : is an acyclic recursor int(A) : G T , and by clause (D4) of the definition of denotations §1.9 and Theorem §3.8, for every assignment g, int(A)(g) = den(A)(g),
i.e., the referential intension of A computes its denotation. §3.14. Diagrams. The computation of den(A) by int(A) can be visualized by depicting the normal form of A in a diagram, as in Figure 1 for A ≡ John loves Mary and she loves every boy. §3.15. Algorithms as recursors. The introduction promised to model the meaning of a term A by an "abstract, idealized algorithm", but what has been delivered is an "acyclic recursor" int(A) = (α 0 , α 1 , . . . , α n ), a tuple of functions. True enough, the referential intension "computes"-after a fashion-the denotation, so that we have the basic picture of a Fregean theory of meaning, with int(A) a precisely defined object modeling the meaning; but can we reasonably view acyclic recursors as abstract algorithms? Despite their undoubted importance for the foundations of the theory of computation, algorithms are rarely defined precisely, i.e., modeled by set-theoretic objects, like the natural and real numbers, functions, random variables, etc. I have proposed that they can be faithfully represented by recursors, systems of functional equations which code all the (intuitively understood) implementation-invariant properties of algorithms; the acyclic recursors we use here are a special case, modeling the abstract algorithms needed to compute the denotations of terms of L ar . I will not repeat here the arguments in support of this proposal which I have already published, most recently in Moschovakis [1998] , [2001] .
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In any case, the slogan meanings are abstract algorithms which compute denotations has strong (I think) intuitive appeal, but it is largely irrelevant to the usefulness and validity of the specific claims about meanings made in this paper. Forget about algorithms: do the results about synonymy and the "solutions" to some of the classic puzzles in the philosophy of language in the next section accord with our intuitions? I think that this should be the real test of usefulness for the proposed modeling of meanings by referential intensions. 29 The two characteristic features of this proposal are that mutual recursion is taken as a primitive to which complex substitutions are reduced (rather than the other way around); and that it allows for infinitary algorithms which cannot be implemented, for example the acyclic int(every number is either odd or even), whose computation would entail verifying that all (the infinitely many) natural numbers have a certain property. §3.16. Natural recursor isomorphism. An acyclic recursor (26) determines for each assignment g the system of mutual recursive equations (g, d 1 , . . . , d n ) . . .
whose unique solutions (along with the head α 0 ) determine the value α(g) as above. The order in which the equations are listed in (27) is of no consequence in this process of evaluation, and so it is natural to "identify" two recursors if they only differ in this respect. The precise definition is a bit technical: Two acyclic recursors 
n).
We set α ∼ = ⇐⇒ α and are naturally isomorphic. §3.17. Referential synonymy. Two proper terms are referentially synonymous if they have naturally isomorphic referential intensions, and two immediate terms are referentially synonymous if they have the same denotations. The Referential Synonymy Theorem §3.2 is very easy to prove with this definitionand much easier to understand and apply than chasing natural isomorphisms. For the purposes of this paper, it might as well be taken as the definition of referential synonymy. Together with the rules for reduction, the Referential Synonymy Theorem implies easily the rules for referential synonymy in Table 8 . Notice the last rule, which is 30 Natural isomorphism is the strictest equivalence relation among recursors which accords with our view of them as "the semantic content" of systems of recursive equations, with a head; the least-strict one is equality of denotations,
In-between these two extremes, there are many interesting and useful ways to identify recursors, depending on what particular kind of "process" we are trying to model. I will confine myself here to natural isomorphism which captures the strictest notion of synonymy, but there are competing "identity conditions" for meanings which may prove useful upon further study. 31 In this paragraph, "immediate" must be read as "congruent to immediate", so that p(v) where { } is immediate. Notice also that (easily), if X and Y are immediate, then From the conceptual point of view, it might be better to define referential synonymy only between proper terms, since the words suggest "same meaning" and immediate terms are not assigned meanings. The rules in Table 8 are simpler and 32 In fact we cannot strengthen the rule to allow a location q in place of the pure variable u, because, with a constant f, easier to use, however, when we have the relation defined between pairs of arbitrary terms, for example in the proof of the §3.18. Compositionality Theorem. For all terms A, B, C and every variable x such that type(x) = type(B) = type(C ),
assuming that the substitution is free.
Proof is by induction on the term A, applying the rules in Table 8 . §3.19. Why not assign meanings to immediate terms? Especially since they have normal forms, which define (trivial) acyclic recursors, and so there is an obvious candidate for the object int(x).
Suppose our structure has a constant id : e → e for the identify function on the set of entities,
so that id(x) and x are both irreducible and denotationally equivalent, and they would be synonymous under any plausible assignment of a meaning consistent with the referential intensions approach; but then compositionality would fail, since for any function constant g, where the crucial, second step is valid because
Proofs of non-synonymy are not so simple when complex terms are involved, because it is tedious to compute normal forms. We show first that acyclic recursion produces more meanings than can be expressed in the -calculus. §3.20. Theorem. (1) No location occurs in more than one part of an explicit term.
(2) Suppose a location p occurs in two parts A k and A l of a term A, and neither A k nor A l denotes a function which is independent of p, i.e., for some assignment to the variables g and objects r, r , den(A k )(g{p := r}) = den(A k )(g{p := r }),
and similarly with A l . It follows that A is not referentially synonymous with any explicit term.
Proof. (1) is very easy, by induction on the definition of explicit terms and using the rules (NF1)-(NF4) in the construction of normal forms §3.10. For example, looking at (NF4), the only way in which some p i can occur in A k and also in A l , with k = l , is if p i occurred in both A k and A l , which is ruled out by the induction hypothesis.
For (2), assume the hypothesis and (towards a contradiction) that A ≈ B with an explicit B, so that
with the denotations matching, and in particular, for all g,
By the hypothesis then, there is a g and r, r such that den(B k )(g{p := r}) = den(B k )(g{p := r }), and this is not possible unless p occurs in B k ; and by the same argument, p must also occur in B l , which contradicts (1). §3.21. Corollary. None of the terms in (18), (19), (20) is referentially synonymous with an explicit term.
Proof. If wife is a constant, then these terms are already in normal form and the location j occurs in at least two of the parts of each of them, so that Theorem §3.20 applies; and if wife is a closed term, e.g.,
then j will occur in the subsequent reduction of wife(j) to normal form, and we can again apply the theorem. §3.22. Hesperus and Phosphorus-again. Let us also keep the promise made in §2.11, to show that with the Montague (quantifier) renderings of proper names,
We will assume, of course, that Hesperus ≈ Phosphorus, since we cannot possibly solve Frege's basic puzzle about identity statements without such an assumption.
The easy way is to assume that the language has two constants, Hesperus and Phosphorus, which name (the quantifier representations of) Venus, but not in all states, i.e., |= Hesperus = Phosphorus.
This would be true, for example, if the names were introduced at different times in history, so that for at least one state a we have Hesperus(a) = Venus, Phosphorus(a) = er, or the other way around. Now
and (28) holds because the heads of these terms are not (denotationally) equal.
The non-synonymy is a bit harder to verify if we assume that Hesperus and Phosphorus are descriptions, but it is worth working it out, as a good exercise in computing with the synonymy calculus. Suppose then that
where first, evening, last, morning : (ẽ →t) → (ẽ →t)
are adjectives, such that, for example, if p is the property of being a "star" visible in the evening sky, and x is a "star", then first(p)(x) ⇐⇒ x is visible before any other evening star.
Moreover, the Montague description operator "the M " acts on relations and produces quantifiers, i.e., the M : (ẽ →t) →q.
We will assume that the M is a constant of L ar denoting this operator, but the other relevant terms (first, evening, . . . ) may be complex, and it is this which makes the non-synonymy argument a bit tedious.
Proof of (28). Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the two sides of (28) are synonymous, and also, for simplicity, at first, that first and last are constants. Easily,
⇒ the M (h)(r) where {h := first(es), es := evening(star),
⇒ the M (p)(r) where {p := last(ms), ms := morning(star)
The subsequent reduction of these terms to normal form will not affect their heads and first parts, which are explicit and irreducible, and so by Theorem §3.2 we will have (m = 1, . . . , s) .
if the locations p i and p k are distinct, simply because the operator the M is not constant; and so we must have that
which is absurd, whether the locations p j and p l are distinct or identical.
The argument is just a bit more tedious if first and last are complex terms. §4. Local meanings and demonstratives. In this section we will consider two standard puzzles about substitutivity in the Philosophy of Language.
33 Both of these have been introduced in the literature as puzzles about belief, but all they assume about it is a principle already found in Frege: that if a rational person can reasonably believe A and not believe B in the same context (state), then A and B are not synonymous. Thus they are really puzzles about synonymy, and it is easy to formulate them precisely within the theory of referential intensions and see what (if anything) it has to say about them-and they about it.
Most Americans know and believe today that "cars are the major cause of pollution", but they did not believe it in 1920, when it was not even true. Thus, the truth and belief carriers are propositions coupled with a state, and it is convenient to give these things a name. §4.1. An utterance 34 is a pair (A, a) of a closed Carnap intension A :t and a state a. To deal effectively with these quasi-syntactic objects, it is useful to add to the language L ar a parameter a for each state a, so that we can identify an utterance (A, a) with the term A(a) : t. These state parameters are not constants, and from the syntactic point of view they behave exactly like pure variables of type s, for which the value of every assignment has been fixed. For example, loves(John, Mary)(a) ⇒ nf loves(j, m)(a) where {j := John, m := Mary}, and the term on the right is the normal form of the utterance on the left because it is irreducible-which it would not be if a were a constant.
Notice that once we add state parameters to the language, they can occur anywhere in a term, like variables; but by "utterance" we will always mean a term of the form A(a), where A is a closed and parameter-free Carnap intension.
The referential intension int(A(a)) models the local meaning of the Carnap intension A in state a. This is analogous to Kaplan's content of A in a, while int(A) corresponds to his character of A, the function which assigns to each state a the meaning of A in a, see Kaplan [1978b] . This function is very simple in the present theory; because if A is closed and A ⇒ nf A 0 where {p 1 := A 1 , . . . , p n := A n } :t, then by the recap rule,
so that the parameter a occurs only in the head part of A(a). The referential intension int(A(a)) is obtained from int(A) by leaving the body of the recursor untouched and simply applying its head function to the state a.
If A(a) ≈ B(a), we say that A and B are (locally) synonymous in state a.
With these notions in place, we can now formulate a much-simplified, monolingual version of the Pierre puzzle in Kripke [1979] .
§4.2. Los Angeles. Petros emigrated from his native Greece to the United States at a rather advanced age, and immediately fell in love with the city of Los Angeles, where he settled. Every chance he gets he declares proudly:

I live in Los Angeles. (A)
When, however, a new acquaintance who had heard of this tried to start conversation with an innocent "I hear you live in LA", Petros looked puzzled, declared again that he lives in Los Angeles, and added emphatically:
Let us now stipulate that the language has constants Los Angeles, LA :ẽ which refer to the same largest city in California in every state, so that
This could be true if, for example, our structure admits only fairly recent states, after both abbreviations 35 for the Southern California city were well established, and we follow the prevailing theory that names refer directly and rigidly in all possible worlds. However the stipulation is justified, (29) implies
since Los Angeles and LA are explicit and irreducible, and then the Compositionality Theorem §3.18 yields reside(I, Los Angeles)(a) ≈ reside(I, LA)(a) (31) 35 The full name of Los Angeles is El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora, la Reyna de Los Angeles de Porciúncula.
for the state a of Petros' two utterances, whatever term (or constant) renders the residence relation. Thus Petros appears to (rationally) believe one utterance and disbelieve a synonymous one, which contradicts our taking utterances as the belief carriers.
The common-sense resolution of the puzzle was expressed by Petros' sister Maria, who commented to those present when her brother made his remarks, He doesn't know that Los Angeles is LA. (32) Now Kripke argues, correctly, that this does not amount to an explanation, because (with the assumptions we have made), Maria's comment is synonymous with He doesn't know that Los Angeles is Los Angeles, which robs it of its explanatory power, and is probably false. So, still following Kripke, we have a genuine puzzle, which means that the example fails to satisfy one of our basic assumptions about semantics; and the most likely culprit, in this case, seems to be Frege's famous doctrine about knowledge of the language:
The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs . . . Comprehensive knowledge of the thing denoted . . . we never attain (Frege [1892] , 27]). To resolve the puzzle, we must argue that someone "sufficiently familiar with the language" in Frege's sense cannot (rationally) utter in the same state both (A) and (B), in other words, that Petros is not a language speaker-he is incoherent. §4.3. Language speakers. There are probably no English speakers who satisfy Frege's stringent criterion of "grasping the totality of designations" of the language. "The language speaker" is an idealization, which we assume in order to develop a logical theory of meaning, much as we assume the existence of perfect vacuum and complete absence of friction in order to develop a mathematical theory of Newtonian mechanics. It is not an internal matter of logic, and its utility must be judged by the plausibility of the conclusions derived from it together with the other (also idealized) hypotheses of the theory. Nevertheless, it is worth examining exactly how much of Frege's doctrine about language speakers we need to accept, and trying to formulate it in logical rather than metaphysical terms.
What does it mean to grasp the sense of a linguistic expression? It is generally assumed that Frege understood senses to be abstract objects, functions and the like, and this already leads to classical metaphysical questions: how do we "grasp" 0, or the notion of natural number? Moreover, unlike Frege, we have allowed constants which refer directly and rigidly to objects that are definitely not abstract, like Los Angeles, and this complicates the problem: part of the referential intension of reside(I, Los Angeles)(a) is the constant function with value Los Angeles, i.e., essentially, Los Angeles (the object), and I have no idea what it means to grasp it. It is good to replace metaphysical hypotheses of this type by assumptions which can be formulated in logical terms. The key to this is Maria's explanation (32), if we understand it not within the language, but as a metalinguistic claim about Petros' insufficient knowledge of the language, i.e., in the form He doesn't know that "LA" is another name for Los Angeles. In short, Petros is incoherent not because he cannot grasp Los Angeles, but because he does not know the crucial, denotational identity (29), which implies the synonymy (30) . Thus, what we need to assume of a language speaker is that (at a minimum) he knows all true identities
between constants of the language, of any type. This is a tall order, to be sure, and Petros fails it, but it is a much easier test to make precise (and pass) than Frege's demand about "grasping". After nearly forty years of living in Los Angeles, I still make no claim that I can "grasp it" (whatever that means), but I certainly know that Los Angeles = LA, and I use both of these constants interchangeably, often with no recollection of which one I employed in any particular utterance. §4.4. Is referential synonymy decidable? Unfortunately, a full-bodied logical version of Frege's doctrine demands more of the language speaker than the knowledge of all identities between constants as in (33). For example, with the most natural assumption about the meaning of "between", easily (34) Los Angeles is between the desert and the sea ≈ Los Angeles is between the sea and the desert, and the language speaker should recognize this synonymy along with all other synonymies. In particular, if we do not want to endow the language speaker with truly supernatural abilities, doing full logical justice to Frege's "grasping doctrine" requires proof of the following purely technical 
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This is still open, although it was shown in Moschovakis [1994] for the language FLR, which extends a reasonably large fragment of L ar .
38 By the Referential Synonymy Theorem §3.2, the Main Conjecture is equivalent to the decidability of denotational identities of the form
between explicit irreducible terms A, B. For example, if we assume for simplicity that "between" is a constant, then (34) follows by compositionality from
which is a denotational identity between explicit, irreducible terms. The language has, however, many and complex explicit, irreducible terms, and so the proof of the full conjecture is not all here. 36 The assumption that there are only finitely many constants in the vocabulary is both natural and (easily) necessary for the Main Conjecture to be true.
37 There is some evidence that Frege believed the Main Conjecture, on the basis of a 1906 letter to Husserl, see Heijenoort [1985] .
38 There is unfortunately a gap in the proof given in Moschovakis [1994] , but it can be easily filled and the result is correct.
For a satisfactory development of a theory of belief in which the belief carriers are utterances, we would also need to prove the following Vague Conjecture. For every state a, uniformly, the relation of referential synonymy A(a) ≈ B(a) between utterances in state a is decidable. This is vague, because its proof will obviously require some assumptions about the interpretation of the constants in each state which I am not now quite sure how to formulate. I think that looking for such assumptions might offer some clues about the meaning (or, at least, the form of the meaning) of belief statements.
Finally, it should be pointed out that although a proof of the Main Conjecture is highly desirable, the status of the conjecture does not affect the development of referential intension theory or its possible applicability to computational semantics. If the Main Conjecture is false, well, then no human being can be a language speaker in principle-but then we already know that, in practice, there are no (perfect) language speakers.
We now turn to the second puzzle, which was introduced by Salmon and Soames in the introduction to Church [1962] , and which is worth quoting verbatim. Now the puzzle comes from the circumstance that He(a) = Scott(a) (35) for the state a at the book-signing, which implies immediately that He(a) ≈ Scott(a), since these two terms are explicit and irreducible. One might suspect from this that (skipping the irrelevant negations)
He is Scott (a) ≈ Scott is Scott (a), (Caution: this is false!) (36) and that would make King George guilty of incoherence. But (36) is not true: So George IV makes two non-synonymous utterances, one false one true; he may be muddled, but he is not incoherent. §4.6. Individual concepts in utterances. The good King can hold onto his erroneous belief that the man who autographed his book is not himself, while poor Petros is not allowed to believe falsely that he does not live where he lives, on pain of incoherence. This is because, intuitively: if you mention an individual concept, then that (full) concept is part of the meaning of your utterance. 41 In the two puzzles above, Los Angeles, LA, He and Scott are all parts of the relevant terms, but Los Angeles = LA, which dooms poor Petros, while He = Scott, which saves the King.
We have already discussed in §4.1 the technical fact behind this claim: the state parameter a occurs only in the head of the normal form of an utterance A(a) and not in its body.
In some more detail, the head of an utterance must have type t, and so it cannot be c(a) for any constant c :ẽ denoting an individual concept; hence every such constant which occurs in a closed Carnap intension A :ẽ is a part of the normal form of every utterance A(a) of A, and every utterance synonymous with A(a) must contain some constant synonymous with c. §4.7. Impossible utterances. Technical explanations are not very satisfying: we are left with the feeling that, whatever the technicalities, the King intended to say that he does not believe
which seems to mean exactly the same as Scott(a) = Scott(a). (41) 40 As I understand him, Kaplan [1978b] would assign the same content to the two propositions He is Scott and Scott is Scott in a state a in which, in fact, He is Scott. This is a sharp difference between the theories of content and local referential intensions. Many of Kaplan's insights in Kaplan [1978b] have found expression in the present theory, but it is not an easy task to work out a detailed comparison of the two approaches. I am grateful to my student Eleni Kalyvianaki who is working on this problem, and who has patiently explained to me some of the more obscure, technical parts of Kaplan [1978b] .
41 Russell would put the city of Los Angeles in the proposition expressed by Petros' utterance, while the referential intension of that utterance contains (as a part) the constant function which assigns the city to every state; there is little difference between the two.
Well, if the King had actually denied (40), then, indeed, we would have had a puzzle, because by compositionality and (35),
But the King did not deny (40), and, indeed, he could not have denied (40) because (40) is not an utterance. It is a term of type t, to be sure, if we take "=" to be the equality relation on T e , but it does not have the logical form A(a) of an utterance. The basic principle here is that the only syntactic expressions we can affirm or deny are closed Carnap intensions, which are interpreted in the current state to produce an utterance; we cannot use the parameter naming the current (or any other) state, any more than we can use a free variable when we speak.
Suppose we try to correct this deficiency of the language by introducing a constant book-signing : s which names the relevant state, den(book-signing) = the state in which the book-signing ceremony took place.
If we replace the state parameter a by the constant book-signing in the terms of (42), we get
and the King can try to deny the first while asserting the second. Formally, he cannot do this, because the type of these terms is t rather thant, but this is a technicality; we can certainly allow people to speak closed terms (without parameters) which denote truth values, so that their interpretation is (a priori) independent of the state-for example, if they want to claim mathematical theorems. But He is a part of (43) and not (denotationally) equal to any part of (44), and so these two terms are not synonymous 42 and the good King has once more escaped incoherence.
To summarize the discussion in this section, what we inferred from the Kripke example was that puzzles which are grounded on a lack of knowledge of the language are not relevant to the development of Fregean semantics, which assume from the get go that the "language speakers" know the language perfectly; and we suggested that the Salmon-Soames puzzle is based on a confusion of the utterance (He is Scott)(a) with the closed term He(a) = Scott(a), which means something entirely differentand is not an utterance. §4.8. The modal interpretation of knowledge and belief. Montague-and practically everybody else-admits a modal interpretation of knowledge: we assume a constant K i :t →t for each "agent" i, and we interpret it by
42 The non-synonymy becomes more obvious if we look at the normal forms of these two terms:
He(book-signing) = Scott(book-signing) I have dismissed (with many others) this understanding of propositional attitudes because of the problem of omniscience: by it, if you know one true, mathematical statement (like 1 + 1 = 2), you know them all. It seems to me that customary knowledge of the truth of an utterance A(a) is grounded on the meaning of A(a), i.e., on the referential intension int(A)(a) by the present modeling of meanings; it is only that (unfortunately), we do not know now how to define properly the meaning of knowledge claims, i.e., the operation
On the other hand, if by K i A(a) we understand that the agent i has potential knowledge of A(a)-she has access to the relevant facts, from which she could deduce the truth or falsity of A(a), if only she were smart enough-then the Montague interpretation makes perfect sense; and there is no doubt that this notion of potential knowledge is a natural and useful one, especially in the analysis of the behavior of computing systems. The only (minor) point perhaps worth making here is that the referential theory of meaning can incorporate potential knowledge and add something to it: the reduction
provides a meaning (not just a truth value) to the potential knowledge claim, so that "knowing that there are infinitely many prime numbers" at least means something different from "knowing that 1 + 1 = 2", even though the two potential knowledge claims are denotationally equivalent. §5. Appendix: an interpretation of intensional logic in L ar . The Language of Intensional Logic LIL introduced in Montague [1973] looks like a fragment of L ar : its types are among the types of L ar , its terms seem to be explicit terms of L ar (relative to the same empirical constants), and both languages are interpreted in essentially the same, standard structure. But Montague understands types differently, so that for any assignment g,
Thus every term A : defines in LIL what we called a Carnap object in §1.3, and in particular, every term of type t is interpreted by a Carnap intension.
This changes dramatically the typing of the basic constants and the interpretation of terms. If we set
then man :ẽ →t, while man : M (e → t).
The interpretation of man for Montague is a function from entities and states into truth values, intuitively in LIL : man(x, a) ⇐⇒ x is a man in state a (x ∈ T e , a ∈ T s ); in L ar , instead, man is interpreted by a function from individual concepts of typeẽ and states to truth values, intuitively in L ar : man(x, a) ⇐⇒ x(a) is a man in state a, (x ∈ T (s→e) , a ∈ T s ).
Montague's is the standard typing convention in Philosophy of Language, it deals in a simpler way with local objects, as these were defined in §2.7, and it certainly seems more natural, at least at first. More substantially, Montague needs to be able to interpret a term A in every state in order to assign meaning to it: the Montague "sense" of A relative to an assignment g is the Carnap intension
This central function of Montague's typing is not needed in L ar , which models meaning by referential intensions. In addition, the typing convention of L ar is standard in Mathematical Logic, it deals more naturally with modal nouns and verbs (e.g., "rises"), and the "internal" handling of state-dependence that it demands makes possible the kind of analysis we did in Section 4 (especially in §4.7) which cannot be given naturally in LIL.
I think that admitting the set of states as a basic set, so that facts about states can be expressed in the formal language, is useful-in fact, essential-for the development of a useful theory of meaning, whether this is modeled by referential intensions or in some other way. However, I will not attempt here to justify this, or to engage in an extensive comparison of the two formal languages. The main aim in this Appendix is to define a formal interpretation of LIL into L ar , which preserves denotations and also logical structure, as far as this is possible with the different typings. The construction is aimed at those already familiar with Section 2 of Montague [1973] , whose pertinent (logical) features and notation I will summarize very briefly. §5.1. The syntax of LIL. Montague uses , for the function type ( → ):
:≡ e | t | 1 , 2 | s, 2 LIL-Types:
The separate constructs s, 2 , 1 , 2 are needed because s (by itself) is not a type of LIL.
There is an obvious way to map the types of LIL into types of L ar , by (hereditarily) changing every , into ( → ). Formally, we define a mapping → * by the recursion e * ≡ e; t * ≡ t; 1 , 2 * ≡ ( 1 * → 2 * ); s, 2 * ≡ (s → 2 * ). (47) There is an infinite sequence of variables v 0 , v 1 , . . . for each LIL-type, and a set K of typed constants, among them the usual logical constants, ¬, & , ∃, ∀, =, , . . . . The last two constructs express -abstraction and application with respect to the (invisible) state variable a which implicitly occurs in every term, and they are needed because the language has no state variables:
The tags at the left of these conditions suggest the intended interpretation, but they should be read with caution: the terms [ˆ ] and [ˇ ] will still define Carnap intensions, so it is as if a new invisible state variable b is "introduced" into these terms after a is bound or used by the constructs.
Free and bound occurrences of variables are defined as usual. §5.2. The intended structure. We assume given a set D s of states, a set
of truth values, and a set D e of entities, and then set recursively, Montague assumes a simple set of states,
where I and J are non-empty given sets of possible worlds and moments of time respectively. To specify the interpretation completely, we may either set T s = D s in L ar or assume the richer L ar set of states for LIL; both assumptions are consistent with the construction. It is further assumed in Montague [1973] that the sets D t and D e do not intersect, but this is never used, so we might as well put the truth values in D e , 0, 1 ∈ D e . In fact, to avoid some unpleasant (and irrelevant) technicalities, we will twist Montague's intended structure a bit and set which imbed the universes of LIL into those of L ar , and use these imbeddings to construct the required interpretation; but nothing of explanatory value is bought by the (considerable) complication in notation, and so it is better to just set D t = D e in LIL which insures (49).
of LIL into L ar , it is not necessary to go into the specifics of this-we will treat all constants alike. §5.3. The semantics of LIL and its imbedding into L ar . We have already imbedded the types of LIL into those of L ar by the mapping → * .
To extend the imbedding to the terms of LIL, we first put into L ar a fresh variable x * for each variable x of LIL, such that if x : M , then x * : (s → * ).
Each assignment g to the variables of LIL induces a corresponding assignment to these fresh variables, by g * (x * ) = (a)g(x) (a ∈ T s );
notice that all the values of g * are constant functions on the set T s of states. Next we put in L ar a constant c * for each constant c of LIL, so that if c : M , then c * : (s → * ), and we set den(c * ) = F (c),
where F (c) is the sense of c in LIL. These moves specify the interpretation of LIL into L ar for types, variables, assignments and constants. The full interpretation α → α * will be defined by recursion on the terms of LIL, and it will have the following three properties:
(i) The free variables of α * are all x * with x free in α; and the constants which occur in α * are exactly all c * , where the constant c occurs in α. Here α → α g,a is the basic semantic operation of LIL, and it is best to recall its definition as we define the imbedding, and also verify (i) -(iii), all at the same time. We take cases on the definition of terms in LIL.
(Imb 1) α ≡ c is a constant. We take c * to be the fresh constant of L ar associated with c, and (i) -(iii) follow immediately from the definition of den(c * ); for example, den(c * , g * )(a) = F (c)(a) = c g,a , the last step by the (expected) semantics of LIL.
(Imb 2) α ≡ x is a variable. We take x * to be the associated, fresh variable of L ar , and (i) -(iii) follow immediately, from the definition of g * .
(Imb 3) α ≡ ( ), in which case the semantics of LIL set α g,a = g,a ( g,a ).
We set
where u is a (fresh) state variable, so that (i) and (ii) are obvious. The last condition (iii) is also essentially obvious, but its precise verification is a bit technical; we compute, using the semantics of L ar and the induction hypothesis:
den(α * , g * )(a) = den( (u) * (u)( * (u)) , g * )(a) = (t) den( * (u), g * {u := t})(den( * (u), g * {u := t})) (a) = den( * (u), g * {u := a})(den( * (u), g * {u := a})) = den( * , g * {u := a})(a) (den( * , g * {u := a})(a) = den( * , g * )(a) (den( * , g * )(a) = g,a ( g,a )
= α g,a .
The crucial step here which deletes the updates {u := a} depends on the fact that the fresh variable u does not occur in * , * , and so den( * , g{u := a}) = den( * , g), and similarly with * .
(Imb 4) α ≡ (v)( ). In this case, α g,a = h, where, for every t, h(t) = g{v:=t},a , and we set α * ≡ (u) (v) * {v * :≡ (w)v}(u) , using fresh state variables u and w. It is easy to check (i) and (ii). To verify (iii), recall that den(α * , g * ) = f, where, for every a and t, f(a, t) = den( * {v * :≡ (w)v}(u), g * {v := t}{u := a});
thus it is enough to show that for every a and t, f(a, t) = g{v:=t},a .
We can now apply the Replacement Property §1.10 and the induction hypothesis and complete the computation: Notice that h does not depend on a. We set
where u, v are distinct, fresh state variables, so that (i) and (ii) are immediate, and den(α * , g, a) = f, where f(a, t) = den( * (v), g * {v := t}), taking into account that u does not occur in * . The fact that v also does not occur in * justifies the first step of the remaining of the computation, and then the induction hypothesis justifies the rest and completes the proof of (iii) in this case:
den( * (v), g * {v := t}) = den( * , g * )(t) = g,t = h(a, t).
(Imb 6) α ≡ [ˇ ], in which case the semantics of LIL sets
where u is a fresh state variable, from which (i) and (ii) are immediate. To prove (iii), using as above the fact that u does not occur in * and the induction hypothesis, we compute:
den(α * , g * , a) = den( (u) * (u)(u) , g * , a) = (t) den( * (u)(u), g * {u := t}) (a) = den( * (u)(u), g * {u := a}) = den( * , g * {u := a})(a)(a) = den( * , g * )(a)(a) = g,a (a) as required. This completes the definition of the interpretation α → α * of LIL into L ar and the proof that it satisfies (i) -(iii). A careful analysis of the relation between the two languages would require a detailed examination of the interpretation c → c * of the Montague constants, but we will not go into this here.
